The Philosophy of Forensic Scientific Identification by Jamieson, Allan
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 59 | Issue 5 Article 3
1-2008
The Philosophy of Forensic Scientific Identification
Allan Jamieson
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allan Jamieson, The Philosophy of Forensic Scientific Identification, 59 Hastings L.J. 1031 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol59/iss5/3
The Philosophy of Forensic Scientific
Identification
ALLAN JAMIESON*
[M]ost lawyers have little or no appreciation for the scientific method
and lack the ability to judge whether proffered research is good
science, bad science, or no science at all.
-David L. Faigman'
INTRODUCTION
This Article will discuss some of the features that make a process
scientific, outline the forensic process through which evidence must
travel, consider the principles and practice of individualization, and
finally describe the difficulties of assessing the significance of any
"match," with particular emphasis on DNA profiling.
I. THE FORENSIC PROCESS
The "forensic process" is the method by which physical evidence is
considered and handled from the crime scene to the court. The aim of
the process is to present probative evidence to the court








The first three of these generally comprise the process of crime
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2. Dan Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic
DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCIS. (forthcoming July 2008).
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scene investigation and will not be considered in detail here.3 It is, in my
opinion, vital that we refine the definitions of the processes of analysis,
interpretation, and evaluation to facilitate discussion of the important
principles that are applied at each step. In particular, "interpretation"
and "evaluation" require definition and differentiation when attempts
are being made to avoid observer bias.'
Evidence is only evidence when it is probative of a story. Without a
story there can be no evidence, rather like no shadow without light.
Evidence becomes forensic evidence when used in a legal process.' Many
pages have been written on how to collect the evidence, but what to
collect receives scant attention despite being crucial to the forensic
process.
Despite the importance of crime scene investigation in the forensic
process, there is no widely accepted common method or agreed practice.
Depending on your initial reasoning it may make sense to collect
everything, or from a different perspective, almost nothing. The difficulty
with crime scene investigation is that it is almost impossible to be sure
that the scene has been properly investigated.6
In many cases there has been a tendency to identify a suspect and
then look for the evidence against him, or assume on cursory
examination what has actually occurred and simply seek confirmatory
evidence. A large number of biases7 can then come into play with the
result that there seems to be an overwhelming case against the accused
and for the desired version of events.
The scientific approach, or method, is purported to be less subject to
the biases and prejudices of the investigator and therefore more likely to
lead to a higher probability of a correct identification of the story,
including the identity of the perpetrator. There is a significant body of
evidence that whilst the scientific method may be unbiased, scientists,
including forensic scientists, are not.8
A crime scene is, in scientific terms, an observation or series of
observations from which the investigator will create a hypothesis or story
that explains the evidence. But of course, no matter what story the
investigator eventually decides upon, there remains the possibility that it
is not the true one. The best that the investigator can hope to achieve is a




6. FAIGMAN, supra note i, at 62.
7. See generally Michael J. Saks et al., Context Effects in Forensic Science: A Review and
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and "most likely" one and the same? Which is more probative?
A. ANALYSIS
Analysis for our purposes is any measurement or observation
performed on an item. We observe and measure things routinely.
Science's very rock is the objective measurement of things. Almost all
measurement is subject to error. Scientifically, we seek to estimate or
measure that error so that we know how much we may trust the result of
the measurement. Measurement of uncertainty is an increasingly
important concept in analytical science, and has a particular importance
in forensic science.
Analysis is a method. The output of analysis is a measure (e.g.,
concentration, weight), identification of a thing (e.g., drug) or feature
(e.g., toolmark), or other result.
It is common for analysis, and the measure, to be considered
together as "interpretation." However, it is useful to restrict the
definition of interpretation in the forensic environment so that the
distinction between the measure (analysis) and the assessment of what
this means (evaluation) is clear.
They are of course closely related, but the same measurement can be
obtained by different methods of analysis, and the analysis may be,
effectively, both interpretation and evaluation . Whatever the method,
the result is then the object of the next step -interpretation.
B. INTERPRETATION
The vast majority of work in the forensic scientific environment is
about establishing a match (i.e., hairs, fibers, paint, DNA, fingerprints,
and other marks and impressions). To do this, we take the output of the
analytical phase and use the results to make our comparison. It is often
not clear how people use the words interpretation and evaluation. It is
nevertheless a useful discipline to separate these as they may involve
different reasoning and different expertise. For most purposes,
interpretation can be regarded as the reporting of the analytical results
without any attempt to go further than describe the output of the
analysis. Examples of interpretation are: concentration of alcohol, type
of drug, and alleles in a DNA profile.
C. EVALUATION
In all of these operations the key feature that differentiates
interpretation from evaluation is that while interpretation may establish
what something is, it is evaluation that attempts to establish what it
means. Evaluation assesses perhaps what the sample matches, and
considers the significance of that in the particular case. Evaluation is the
assessment, in a specific case, of the probative value of the interpretation.
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This allows us to identify another general guideline about the
difference between analysis, interpretation, and evaluation: generally
speaking, the required degree of case-related knowledge increases at
each stage. Analysis can usually be performed by what have been
regarded as technical staff, interpretation in most areas can be performed
by someone with a good training and understanding of science, whereas a
knowledge of the forensic issues is a requirement for many types of
evaluation. Evaluation is obviously an important component of
casework. The output of evaluation is the opinion of the expert, usually
expressed in a written statement or report.
Evidence evaluation is emerging as one of the most interesting and
complex debates in forensic science. One example illustrates the
difficulty with what has been a fairly common approach to handling
evidence, summarized in the oft-used phrase in expert reports: "[T]his
evidence is consistent with . . . ." The current thinking is that this only
goes part way to helping the court.9 The key issue is the other stories the
evidence is consistent with, and the relative strengths of each in
evidential terms.
Before evidence can be presented to a court it must conform to the
jurisdiction's rules on admissibility.'" Generally speaking, most
jurisdictions will require that admissible evidence is "probative,"
meaning providing support to one side of a case or the other."
Probative value will be specific to a case rather than to a specific
finding. Assessing the probative value is part of the evaluation of the
evidence. Consider the finding of DNA from the suspect in a vaginal
swab in a case of alleged rape. Is this evidence probative?
If the defendant accepts that sex occurred but there was consent, is it
probative evidence?
In a murder, the blood from the accused is found on of the victim's
clothes and vice versa. Is this evidence probative? If the defendant
concedes that he visited the victim the day before and a fight occurred
that involved both of them shedding blood, then the evidence is not
probative. The simple fact that evidence is 'consistent with' a particular
story provides only a limited value to a court when set out in such terms.
This is a crucial element in evidence-based decisions. The issue is not,
does the evidence support this story, but, of all the stories supported by
the evidence, is this one the most likely?
9. See, e.g., Allan Jamieson, Bad Language, THE JOURNAL, Sept. 2007, at 22, available at
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/pdf/2oo7-o9.pdf; see also FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMMITTEE
WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 115 (2004), available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/engldept-min/pub/pmj-pej/pmj-pej.pdf.
1o. FED. R. EVID. 702.
is. Id.
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II. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD: MATCHING
Much has been written about "the scientific method," and yet there
seems little agreement about what it is. Perhaps the difficulty arises from
the possibility that there is not one, but several, scientific methods. Sir
Peter Medawar writes: "If the purpose of scientific methodology is to
prescribe or expound a system of enquiry or even a code of practice for
scientific behaviour, then scientists seem to be able to get on very well
without it."' 2 What chance do we have when it is said that, "[i]n science,
as in politics, religion, philosophy, etc., our beliefs are consequences of
complex historical, psychological and social processes and interactions.
The power of these processes and interactions makes the attempt to
identify a method for science misleading and unnecessary."' 3
There is no doubt that scientific breakthroughs sometimes occur in
unpredicted and unpredictable ways. We can begin by describing some
features that could generally be agreed to make a process scientific. Carl
Sagan said: "Science is more than a body of knowledge; it is a way of
thinking."'4 Defining that way of thinking is not easy.
A scientific approach to a problem may comprise the sequence of:
(I) observation, (2) measurement, (3) hypothesis creation, (4) hypothesis
testing. This simple sequence hides a number of variations on the theme.
Observation may be casual and lack measurement, or structured and
measured. Either de novo, or from observations, a hypothesis can be
constructed and tested experimentally. This enables the scientist to either
predict what effect will result from a particular cause or, as required of
the forensic scientist, work from the observed effect to a cause.
The scientist necessarily uses inductive reasoning in the creation of
hypotheses. Unfortunately, there is no intrinsic logical basis for that
because no matter how many times it happens, you can never actually
know that it will happen the next time. Of course the more occasions that
the system performs the same way the more we believe that our
hypothesis is correct. This is the basis of the Bayesian approach to
evidence evaluation; using our prior beliefs in conjunction with evidence
to assess hypotheses. However, one failure and the hypothesis will
require modification or abandonment: "[S]cience looks like the most
courageous activity that a person can undertake. But it also is a tragic
one because, in this picture, you can find out that you are certainly
wrong, but you can never know that you are certainly right."'
5
12. PETER MEDAWAR, PLUTO'S REPUBLIC 78 (1984).
13. BARRY GOWER, SCIENTIFIC METHOD: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION I6
(1997).
14. CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE DARK 25 (1997).
15. GALILEO'S COMMANDMENT: 2,500 YEARS OF GREAT SCIENCE WRITING 42 (Edmund Blair Bolles
ed., 1999).
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Optical illusions provide a good illustration of the difficulties with
simple observation as a guide to reality. We process the information that
we receive and this can change our perceived "reality."
Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-
road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of
nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is
familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They
complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all
danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense
and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason,
meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples
spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we
seemed fully to comprehend.
6
As Faigman warns: "The law must be cautious before relying on
experience in light of relatively straightforward lessons of history that
common sense about the empirical world-even based on extensive
experience-is often wrong.''I7
The scientific method is an attempt to create a consistent model of
the universe. Observations are one way for us to test our model, but we
do that testing within a framework that attempts to minimize the errors
in observation and measurement that every test is subject to.
Individualization is a matching problem, and matching is a
population problem. The goal of most forensic matching is to reduce the
potential population from which an item could have come, to one. This
extreme is the definition of identification. The process that we are more
interested in, because of its more common application, is that of
individualization. Individualization recognises that most scientific
evidence is probabilistic, which is to say that we attempt to establish a
probability or likelihood that two items had a common origin. The single
exception to this practice is of course the community of fingermark
experts.
There are three inputs to the match decision:
(i) Description of the mark (e.g., DNA profile from crime stain).
(2) Description of the source (e.g., DNA profile from suspect).
(3) Criteria for a match (e.g., all alleles match-no alleles in crime
stain not present in suspect).
To claim a scientific basis for an expertise, the expert should be able
to demonstrate for the technique(s) that they use, as a minimum:
(i) Reliability studies of analytical technique (validation)
The scientific approach to this problem is normally to put a sample
i6. BISHOP GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
(07Io), available at http://i8th.eserver.org/berkeley.html.
17. FAIGMAN,SUpra note i, at 8o.
[Vol. 59:1031
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through the system to see how often the sample produces the same
result. This is the reproducibility of the technique; its ability to provide
consistent results when applied to the same samples.
(2) Establishment of false positive and false negative rates
Even if the technique is perfect, in many systems there is not a clear
difference in the measurement when it is used to separate two or more
groups. A false positive occurs when something that does not have the
characteristic being sought is classified as actually having them, whereas
a false negative is when something should be placed in a particular class
but isn't. Generally, systems are designed to minimize the number of
false positives and false negatives. However, in many systems the two are
inextricably linked and as one attempts to minimize one error, the other
increases.
(3) Defined match criteria
This requires a specification for the degree of similarity that two
items must have before we declare a match. The specificity or
discriminating power of a technique is "[tihe ability of an analytical
procedure to distinguish between two items of different origin."' 8 Given
that all matches are probable matches this leads to the further
requirement to know the
(4) Probability of any match being a true match
As we increase the stringency of the requirements then the more
sure we may be that we actually have a match, but at some point we will
have made the requirements so tight that even a matching item is not
classed as a match because it will differ in some, possibly trivial and
irrelevant, way. The opposite effect is obtained when we reduce the
stringency of our match criteria so much that almost nothing can be
excluded as matching.
In most non-forensic biology, physics, and chemistry there are clear
match parameters to enable one to say that sample "A" is or is not a
bison, bismuth, or a boson. In forensic science, we can say that something
is a bomb, bullet, or buprenorphine, but it gets a little more difficult
when we get to the questions such as, "is this the same bomb as that?" or
"did this bullet come from this gun?"
Setting aside some of the difficulties in allelic attribution, a DNA
profile can be matched to another DNA profile with ioo% accuracy
(interpretation), and with a precision dependent on the number of loci
used in the match (evaluation). The "match criteria" are defined; the
numbers must match exactly.
I8. Scientific Working Group on Materials Analysis, Forensic Paint Analysis and Comparison
Guidelines, FORENSIC SCI. COMM., July 1999, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/julys999/painta.
htm#3.o%2oTerminology.
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Having established the degree to which a match exists (it will rarely
be perfect), the forensic scientist must now evaluate the significance of
the match.
Another parameter that may be useful to know when assessing an
identification system is the sensitivity. In this context, this means how
little of the material from the individual that needs to be available to
enable an identification. For example, to identify a person only a few
molecules of DNA may be required, but a significant area would
normally be necessary to allow identification by facial recognition.
If you see only a part of someone's face you may be unsure whether
it is who you think it is. As you can see more you become more confident
in the identification, until you are sure that it is the person you thought it
was. They do not look exactly as you saw them the last time; perhaps
they have shaved; their hair is different; they have glasses; they're a little
fatter or thinner; yet you are sure that your identification is correct. The
closer you look, the less that they will resemble the version of the person
you are using as a reference to compare them against. If you saw them
only a month ago, and look at the surface of their skin you will find that
the cells of the skin are not the same ones that were there a month ago.
Their hair is longer, their biochemistry is subtly different. Yet you are
sure that this is the same person.
Consider a hair. If I remove a hair from a person's head and cut it in
two then if I look at the two pieces with the naked eye they may look
identical. I would say that they are the same; a match. This 'match' may
even hold when I look at them under a low power microscope. But at
some level of detail, it may even be the chemistry of the parts of the hair,
I will find a difference; they will no longer match.
How close does a match need to be before we say it's a match? How
many differences do you need to come to a conclusion of no match? It is
an issue with all evidence based on marks and impressions, or anything
where a 'match' is declared. Did the analyst not look close enough to find
a difference, or too close to see a match?
The principles underlying the scientific use of marks and impressions
are no different from any scientific comparison and matching exercise.
Whether the forensic application of these satisfies those criteria may
depend on the history, the practice, the courts, and the practitioners
involved in the discipline.
This is a time of increasing stringency in the requirements of experts
to establish the reliability of the techniques that they use as well as their
authority in the use of those. Many systems have been and are being
developed that aim to assist the court in assessing such claims. However,
most of these have been by a group of experts in the same field forming
themselves into some sort of group and deciding for themselves whether
[Vol. 59:1031
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it is expertise, and who they will register or endorse. External validation
should be a feature of any such system.
Most professional codes of practice for forensic scientists demand
that the scientist is an impartial participant in the legal process. 9
Unfortunately, while science may be impartial in a very restricted sense,
it would appear from a considerable body of research that scientists are
not. "Forensic scientists have not progressed beyond trying to will the
problem [of bias] away by directing themselves not to allow these
influences to affect their judgement""
Notice that there is no suggestion here of dishonesty, merely a lack
of awareness of the effect of bias.
III. DNA: A CASE STUDY
Some of the problems emanating from the supposedly objective
measurement of DNA profiles can be illustrated by a case study. Insofar
as DNA profiling is concerned, the Forensic Process model is applied as:
(i) Analysis -extraction, amplification, and electrophoresis using
the SGM+ kit
(2) Interpretation-What alleles are present?
(3) Evaluation-How many contributors are there?
A. ANALYSIS
In standard SGM+ genotyping, a known quantity of DNA is
subjected to the analytical process. Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) is
the method used to multiply the number of DNA molecules at the
relevant loci to an amount that can be detected by the equipment. This
multiplication is called amplification. Different alleles have different
lengths of DNA.
Each cycle of PCR approximately doubles the amount of DNA at
the relevant loci, producing roughly 2n copies where n is the number of
repetitions or "'cycles." To separate the different lengths of DNA, the
molecular equivalent of a sieve is used. The different sized DNA
molecules are detected by a laser that sends a signal to be processed by
computer. A chemical trick applied during the amplification process
causes the alleles to glow different colors in the laser light and these are
reproduced on the densitometric scan (how dense the bands or rungs of
the ladder are). This makes it easy to see the different alleles as peaks on
a graph. The graph is called an electrophoretogram (epg). Creating the
19. See, e.g., Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners, Code of Conduct,
http://www.crfp.org.uk/standards/setting/code/code.htm (last visited Apr. 2o, 20o8) ("Recognise that
your overriding duty is to the court and to the administration of justice: it is your duty to present your
findings and evidence, whether written or oral, in a fair and impartial manner.").
20. Saks, supra note 7, at 77-90.
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epg is a computer-controlled mathematical operation.
Under ideal circumstances, all of the alleles in a sample will be
observed in the epg. When an allele is not observed, the resultant profile
is referred to as a "partial" profile. The terms partial and full when
applied to profiles are relative terms dependent on the alleles that should
be found. A full profile using one type of kit may assess 16 loci, whereas
another kit may only be designed to assess io. A full profile in the latter
would only be a partial profile in the former assuming that all of the
alleles in the latter were also assessed by the former.
The illustrative case was received by the Forensic Institute in 2007.
A profile had been obtained from a surface. It was intended to prosecute
person A with a crime that would have resulted in a minimum jail term
of five years.
B. INTERPRETATION
One part of the epg is shown in Figure I:
FIGURE I: PART OF ELECTROPHORETOGRAM WITH PEAK HEIGHT
THRESHOLDS MARKED AT 50, 25, AND iO RFU's.
90 100 110 120 130 140 10 160 170 100 190 200 210 220 20 240 250
40.
20"0 V ... . . '
The epg shows molecular size along the x-axis and relative
fluorescence units (RFU's) on the y-axis. The locations of known alleles
are marked by the grey verticals (known as "bins"). An allele is declared
when a peak is located in a bin. The decision as to what is or is not a peak
is made using what is known as a peak height threshold. The threshold is
the minimum number of RFU's that a peak has to attain before it is
considered a 'true' peak.
Observation of figure I shows that the baseline is not even. This is, in
scientific parlance, noise. The analyst must decide which peaks are noise
and which are a signal caused by the presence of allelic DNA. Despite
the number of years that profiling such as this has been performed, there
is as yet no widely adopted objective method of determining what is
signal and what is noise. Gilder et al., for example, have suggested
statistical methods similar to those used by analytical chemists who have
been faced with similar decisions for many years."
21. Jason R. Gilder et al., Run-Specific Limits of Detection and Quantitation for STR-Based DNA
Testing, 52 J. FORENSIC SCIs. 97, 97 (2007).
[Vol. 59:1o31
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The choice of peak height threshold has a significant effect on the
number of alleles that are identified in this profile. Table I sets out all of
the allelic designations at peak height thresholds of 50, 25, 15, and io
RFU's. Fifty RFU is a common starting place for analysts to place the
peak height threshold; they can then move it apparently according to
taste!
If interpretation is the decision as to how many peaks are in a profile
it is not difficult to see that there is considerable scope for different
analysts to arrive at different conclusions.
The 5o, 25, 15, and io, thresholds result in the finding of 5, 13, 16,
and 21 alleles respectively (ignoring the amelogenin, or sex, locus which
has an X).
The number of alleles at a locus is the most obvious parameter used
to determine the minimum number of potential contributors. Each
person has a maximum of two alleles at any locus, one from each parent.
When the allele received from each parent is the same the individual is
homozygous for the alleles at that locus. When the alleles from each
parent are different the individual is heterozygous at that locus. Each
allele should have the same amount of DNA and so produce a peak in
the epg approximately the same size as its partner allele; a i:i ratio. This
does not always happen. Most analysts consider that two peaks can be
considered as originating from a heterozygote if the smaller peak is no
less than about 6o% of the height of the larger peak." There is again no
set limit for this, and the relationship breaks down at very low amounts
of DNA when the peak height imbalance can be any value between o%
and ioo%.
The absence of alleles where they should be is termed allelic
dropout. For example, at 25 RFU there are no alleles at all at the FGA
locus. Only when an entire locus has dropped out, or the expected profile
is known can dropout be unambiguously demonstrated, otherwise it is an
explanation of an observed effect.
In this case, the simplest interpretation of the 5o, 25, and 15 RFU
profiles obtained is a single source as there are no more than two alleles
at any locus.
The io RFU profile (this is a very low threshold) indicates a mixture
of at least two individuals because three alleles are found at each of D3
and D21.
22. See generally T.M. Clayton et al., Analysis and Interpretation of Mixed Forensic Stains Using
DNA STR Profiling, 91 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 55 (1998); Carl Ladd et al., Interpretation of Complex
Forensic DNA Mixtures, 42 CROATIAN MED. J. 244 (2001).
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TABLE I: EFFECT OF LOWERING PEAK HEIGHT THRESHOLD
AMEL D3 vWA DI6 D2 D8 13D21 D I8 Dig I FGA INTERPRETATION
PERSON A X X 15 I6 9 17 12 29 i6 '3 7 20
- 17 1 18 2 18 1 0 18 14 7 21
PERSON B X X 14 16 12 17 13 30 15 14 8 22
15 17 1 1 31.2 16 15 9.3 23
THRESHOLD
Single source,
5 o RFU X i8 12 30 13 7 hi gh RMP for A
16 12 13 Single source,25 RFU X 17 1 12 17 14 30 18 14 7 medium RMP
17 I8 14 14 for A
15 RFU 15 I6 12 30 18 13 7 23 Single source,
17 18 - 4 31.2 14 9-3 not Aor B
14 29 15 13 7 Mixture, A or B
i RFU X i6 9 17 12 1 13 23 cannot be
8 12 18 14 1 8 14 9.3
-17 31.2 excluded
C. EVALUATION
The summary of the evaluation of these profiles is in Table I.
At 50 RFU the profile matches person A with a fairly high random
match probability (i.e., the probability that the DNA came from
someone else; poor evidential value). If the 50 RFU profile is from a
single source, then person B is excluded as the source. Even though they
match at four out of five alleles, they have no i8 allele at the vWA locus.
At 25 RFU the profile also matches person A with a lower random
match probability (i.e. higher evidential value). Dropout has certainly
occurred in both of these results as entire loci are missing from the
profiles. At those loci showing at least a single allele it is only by
reference to a known profile, such as person A or person B, can dropout
be said to occur. Furthermore, it can be proposed that these profiles are
a mixture of A and B, not a single source, which has been subject to
considerable dropout. This is 'consistent with' the observation.
Interesting things begin to happen at i5 RFU. This is also apparently
a single source profile using the number of alleles. However, if this is so,
then the profile could NOT have originated from A or B; it could be a
single source, the unknown person C. If A is the accused, then this leaves
the prosecution with a difficulty in that the 25 RFU profile could now be:
(I) Person C (not A)
(2) Person A and another
(3) Person B and another
(4) Two people with unknown profiles capable of producing the
observed result.
[Wol. 59:1031
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Clearly it is not possible to establish from the profiles alone which of
these is true.
Proponents of the Bayesian approach would have to concede that
the most likely explanation for the observation at 15 RFU in this case is
also the simplest: this is a single source profile from an unknown person
who is not A.
Lowering the peak height threshold to io RFU, admittedly an
unusually low threshold, produces yet further possibilities. There are two
loci that show three alleles, indicative of a mixture of at least two people.
The possibilities are now a:
(i) Mixture of A and another (could be B, C, or another)
(2) Mixture of B and another (could be A, C, or another)
(3) Mixture of C and another (could be A, B, or another)
(4) Mixture of two or more unknowns.
The phrasing used in reports, at least in the UK, would be that A,
''cannot be excluded as a potential contributor." The court is not told
how many other people, "cannot be excluded."
In the actual case in question, the prosecution scientist set the peak
height threshold at 25 RFU, the threshold offering the best evidence
against A. No explanation was offered why this was the chosen
threshold.
When dropout occurs it is essential that great caution is used in the
interpretation and evaluation of profiles. Worryingly, it is possible to
obtain what would normally be interpreted as a partial or full single
source profile from a mixture. The example in Table 2 is based on
another case involving three unrelated people. The 'mix' profile is
derived from counting only those alleles that occur at least twice in the
profiles of the contributors. If the limit of detection (sensitivity) of DNA
used to analyze this mixture requires at least a 'double dose' of two
alleles to produce a signal, or the amount of DNA in the sample is
reduced for any reason, then it is possible that the resultant profile will
have the appearance of a full or partial single source profile identical or
very similar to the 'mix.'
Two obvious consequential errors arise from this profile. First, it was
a mixture that has been identified as most likely a single source. Second,
the resultant profile does not belong to any of the contributors.
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TABLE 1I: A MISLEADING MIXTURE
PERSON D3 [VwA DI6 D2 11 D8 1 D21 Di8 D9 THOI FGA
X 17 I6 11 24 12 30 13 15 9 1817 17 12 25 I1 30.2 15 15 -.3 22
y 13 15  11 17 13 29 15 13 9.3 22
18 I8 12 1 30 16 15 9-3 24
z 14 17 11 24 13 28 I6 13 6 22
16 17 13 24 I6 29 17 14 1 6 22
Mix 17' [ I7 I 3 I I .9 5 1 3 I 61721 24 16 3o 16 15 9 22
Having established how the occurrence of dropout can lead to gross
errors in the evaluation of the number of contributors, and the
contributors' profiles, we can return to the example case. It has been
demonstrated that, even accepting the prosecution's interpretation that a
peak height threshold of 25 RFU is appropriate and the number of
alleles is 13, it is entirely possible that this is neither the profile of the
source of the DNA, nor the correct number of contributors.
It could be argued that there is only a very small probability that
such an error will produce a profile that matches a suspect by chance.
Mixtures produce specific problems in that once alleles from different
sources are mixed it is impossible to know which allele was associated
with which source. The major exception to this is the finding of what is
known as a major-minor mix; a mixture with a large amount of DNA
from one person and a very much smaller amount from another. Again,
there are no experimental studies to show at what level it is safe to
separate the major and minor profile. How does one interpret a mixture
which shows a clear major-minor separation except at a single locus?
Two?
In mixtures without such an easy separation it is impossible to know
the actual contributors. All that can be done is to reduce the population
to those who could have contributed. Dropout again complicates this in
that, if dropout has occurred, it impossible to exclude anyone as a
potential contributor. Combining this with the fact that dropout is
frequently only invoked when comparing a profile with a known profile,
and therefore this is rather begging the question with crime-stains,
dropout should be considered to render mixture interpretation almost
impossible.
By way of illustration, if one locus has four alleles, A, B, C, and D,
and originated from only two people, the contributors could have
genotypes, AB and CD, AC and BD, or AD and BC. Across ten loci,
with two alleles per contributor, there are over one million ways to
interpret a mixture of two contributors. Put a different way, a mixture of
DNA from two people could produce a million possible profiles which
could have caused it. It is frequently not obvious how a scientist derives
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the opinion that favors one of these options over any of the others. At
the very least, the possibility of other interpretations should feature in
reports but, sadly, do not. In casework, we frequently come across DNA
reports that all but ignore any other possible interpretation than the one
that provides the best probative value against the accused; the case
example illustrates the point. The most obvious explanation is that the
scientist has been influenced by knowledge of the profiles of those
involved, whether it is the complainer or the suspect.
This type of bias has been the subject of a meeting in Washington in
2007 at which it was concluded, "forensic DNA analysts often must
resolve ambiguities, particularly when interpreting difficult evidence
samples such as those that contain mixtures of DNA from two or more
individuals, degraded or inhibited DNA, or limited quantities of DNA
template.... [they] are commonly aware of submitted reference profiles
when interpreting DNA test results, creating the opportunity for a
confirmatory bias, despite the best intentions of the analyst." 3
The solution suggested was that the analyst should have no
knowledge of a suspect's profile until they had completed the
interpretation (i.e., number of alleles, number of contributors, possible
profiles of contributors) before having knowledge of the suspect's
profile. This process was termed sequential unmasking."
As more mixtures are recovered with the increasing sensitivity of
testing, and the number of profiles submitted to databases increases, the
probability of chance matches to a particular profile increase. This
should affect the probative value of the evidence yet no attempt seems to
be made to incorporate this in scientific reports.
CONCLUSION
The influence of DNA not only in criminal investigation, but on the
whole practice of forensic science, cannot be understated. Many of the
features that have made DNA evidence so robust (e.g., laboratory
validation, population databases, statistical evaluation, input from the
wider scientific community) have created a scientific standard for
practices within other areas of expertise associated with producing
evidence of individualization. Some have taken this challenge up with
more enthusiasm than others, and are suffering for it. Only the
protection of some courts has prevented some expertise associated with
marks and impressions from being sent back to the drawing board.
The better definition of interpretation and evaluation within the
Forensic Process has been clarified here to facilitate sensible discussion
of the separate but linked processes involved in all scientific assessment
23. Krane et al., supra note 2.
24. Id.
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of evidence. In particular, this separation makes it easier to implement,
practically and theoretically, the sequential unmasking process suggested
by Krane et al. in the analysis of DNA.
Although many of the technical difficulties in producing DNA
profiles have been overcome, the correct approach to interpretation and
evaluation of DNA profiles is still very much a matter for debate. Some
of these have been discussed herein. Many of the arguments presented
here are deliberately incomplete, for which I make no apology. My
purpose is to stimulate thought and debate about concepts that appear to
have been taken for granted. Some of the material is new, some will be
familiar to those in the field.
In questioning scientists how they know that their interpretation of
profiles is the correct one, we are frequently told that it is their 'case
experience' that validates the opinion. Returning to the difficulty of
working from observed effect to cause, it is entirely unclear how a
forensic scientist can use such uncontrolled and unsatisfactory
information as that associated with criminal casework to be able to say
with any confidence at all -that a particular type of profile is 'caused' by
the specific circumstance of the case is a cause of great concern. Only
data from properly controlled experimental work can produce the
confidence and the expertise to support such opinion. "Clearly we learn
from experience but it is the way that we learn that distinguishes the
scientific from the unscientific."25
25. I.W. Evett, Expert Evidence and Forensic Misconceptions of the Nature of Exact Science, 36
Sl. & JUST. 118, 122 (1996).
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